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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of strengthening Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) on within-country 
income inequality for a cross-section of 65 developed and developing countries for the time period 1995-
2009.Our results indicate that strengthening of IPRs has led to an increase in income inequality in WTO-
member developing countries after they started modifying their national IPR regimes to conform to the 
TRIPs requirements. IPRs tend to raise income inequality by generating a more skewed distribution of 
wages. Stronger IPRs increase the demand for skilled labor force as it raises the return on R&D activities. 
This causes a relative increase in skilled labor wages, creating a wage bias in favor of skilled labor against 
unskilled labor, thus aggravating income inequality within a developing country. Moreover, the effect on 
inequality is more pronounced for developing countries that are experiencing higher per capita GDP 
growth rates. As for the developed countries included in the sample, the analysis seems to suggest that 
IPRs have led to a decline in income inequality over the study period.  
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Intellectual Property (IP) refers to products or ideas that are creations of an individual’s mind. Intellectual 
Property Right (IPR) refers to the legal right conferred on the holder of such ideas for exclusive use of its 
intellectual capital. The increased globalization of markets has made it possible for firms to sell their 
products in other countries and to choose foreign destinations for production and investment purposes. 
But this benefit has come at a cost, as globalization has also made it easier for intellectual property to be 
accessed and copied (through imitation or reverse engineering) in countries that provide weaker IPR 
protection.  
This consideration has led to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs), a product of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of trade negotiations. The TRIPs Agreement, for 
the first time, provides for certain minimum standards for protection and enforcement of IPRs among the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries. The Agreement provides varied conditions for 
different areas of IP. Basically, it covers seven areas of IPR, which include copyright, patents, 
trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, semiconductor topographies and undisclosed 
information. In light of the development goals of member countries, the Agreement has set differentiated 
timelines across countries, depending on their level of development. Developing countries have been 
given additional time to implement the applicable changes to their national IP laws, basically in terms of  
two tiers of transition. The transition period for developing countries expired in 2005, that is to say that 
these became fully TRIPs compliant. In comparison, the transition period for the least developed 
countries (LDCs) to become TRIPs compliant was extended to 1 July, 2013 and further until 1 January 
2016 for the pharmaceutical patents, with the possibility of further extension. 4  The TRIPs Council 
comprising of all WTO members, agreed on 11 June, 2013 to extend this deadline to 1 July 2021 for the 
LDCs to protect IP under the WTO’s TRIPs agreement, with a further extension possible when the time 
comes.5 
Following the TRIPs Agreement, a body of research has now emerged that focuses on the potential 
impact of TRIPs and IPRs on international technology transfer and diffusion, economic growth and 
welfare. Most of the theoretical literature that analyzes welfare implications of IPRs has come to the 
conclusion that North (developed countries) tends to benefit and South (developing countries) loses in 
terms of welfare due to more stringent IPR protection in the South (Helpman 1993; Lai 1997; Grossman 
and Lai 2005; Chu and Peng 2011). The channels of technology transfer and the ability of the South to 
take advantage of the technology to which it is exposed play a major role in ascertaining welfare 
implications of stronger IPRs. However, a major drawback of these studies is that, barring a few, most of 
them do not consider the distributional consequences of IPRs while evaluating the impact of IPRs on 
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overall welfare. IPRs can affect income distribution of a country through a direct channel, for example, 
through wage distribution. Stronger patent rights can increase wage inequality by increasing the return to 
research and development (R&D) and the wage rates of R&D workers, who are mostly skilled labor 
(Cozzi and Galli 2009). More stringent IPRs can also raise income inequality indirectly via differences in 
income growth rates. For instance, Chu and Peng (2011) postulate that strengthening of IPRs spurs 
growth rates, which raises disparities in wealth distribution, leading to an increase in income inequality. A 
higher growth rate increases the real interest rates through the Euler equation. Higher real interest rates 
imply higher return on assets. This higher return on assets increases the income of the asset-wealthy 
households relative to the asset-poor households in each country. 
As far as empirical studies are concerned, there exist several that focus on the relationship between IPRs 
and economic growth (Gould and Gruben 1996; Thompson and Rushing 1996, 1999; Falvey, Foster and 
Greenaway 2006; Schneider 2005). However, to the best of our knowledge, there exists only one study 
that examines the relationship between IPRs and income inequality, which is by Adams (2008). Adams 
(2008) examines the relationship between IPRs and income inequality for a cross-section of 62 
developing countries over a period of 17 years (1985-2001). He finds that strengthening of IPRs produces 
a significantly worsening effect on income inequality, implying that income inequality is raised.  
The motivation for this paper stems from the fact that a higher economic growth prospect due to 
strengthening of IPRs loses its relevance if the benefits of higher growth are reaped only by a section of 
the society or concentrated in a group within the economy. Given that income inequality is a social 
concern, these distributional consequences should also be taken into consideration while studying the 
welfare implications of IPRs. The objective of our study is to fill this significant gap in the literature on 
IPRs by formally studying the distributional consequences of strengthening of IPRs on both developed 
and developing countries. 
Since the TRIPs agreement requires WTO members to meet certain minimum standards of IP protection 
within a stipulated period of time, the onus of harmonization of IPRs largely falls on developing member 
countries. In light of this, it will be interesting to study how the enforcement of a stronger IPR regime has 
affected income-inequality in these developing countries. This study attempts to examine the impact of 
strengthening IPRs on income inequality in WTO-member developing countries after they initiated the 
process of complying with the requirements of the TRIPs agreement. Alongside, the study aims to use 
variables such as net FDI inflows, imports, secondary education enrolment rates, and population growth 
rates as controls, so as to clearly delineate the effect of IPRs on income distribution. 
Since, barring one study (i.e. by Adams 2008), almost all the existing studies that examine the impact of 
IPRs on income-inequality are theoretical in nature (see, for instance Chu and Peng (2011), Chu (2009a)), 
we intend to contribute to the existing literature on IPRs and income-inequality by carrying out an 
empirical investigation of the subject. We believe that, in comparison to Adams (2008), our study is an 
improvement in at least two specific ways. First, it includes both developing and developed countries in 
the sample. The empirical analysis has been conducted on a balanced panel of 65 developed and 
developing countries. The aim is to study the impact of strengthening IPRs on income inequality in both 
developed and developing countries, and also check whether the effect on income inequality is different 
between the two groups of countries. Second, the analysis covers the time period 1995-2009, which is 
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more relevant as it overlaps with the timeline of compliance with TRIPs Agreement by the developing 
countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the subject. Section 3 discusses the methodology used in the paper. Section 4 describes the 
data. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review  
While there exists substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of IPRs on 
economic growth (Helpman 1993; Lai 1997; Grossman and Lai 2004; Falvey, Foster, & Greenaway 
2006; Schneider 2005), the studies that focus on the IPR–income inequality relationship are rather 
limited. Moreover, most of these attempt theoretical analyses of the issue. 
Chu and Peng (2011) study the effects of IPR protection on income inequality across countries. They 
develop a two-country R&D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity among households. In the 
model, both the North and the South invest in R&D, but North has a higher degree of innovative 
capability than South. Within this framework, they derive the following results. Firstly, strengthening 
patent protection in either country increases both countries’ (a) economic growth by increasing R&D and 
(b) income inequality by raising the return on assets. They also derive the pre-TRIPs Nash equilibrium 
level of patent protection that is sub-optimally low as it ignores cross-country spillovers of patent 
protection. Also, North chooses a higher level of patent protection than  South and imposing the North’s 
higher level of patent protection on the South, as required by TRIPs agreement, increases (decreases) 
welfare in the North (the South). The authors find that there exists a critical level of cross-country 
spillover below (above) which global welfare is lower (higher) under TRIPs. This varying degree of 
cross-country spillover is captured by the importance of foreign goods in the domestic consumption 
basket. In the Nash equilibrium, the degree of the positive externality is determined by this structural 
parameter. When the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption is small, the cross-country 
spillovers of innovation are small as well. In this case, imposing the North’s level of patent protection on 
the South makes the South worse off without making the North much better off, as both North and South 
are almost in a situation of autarky. Innovation in the North will not lead to a large increase in monopoly 
profits if foreign goods are not demanded in the South. Therefore, North will not be much better off and, 
as explained above, South is also worse-off due to deviation from its first-best response. Therefore, global 
welfare reduces unambiguously, if the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption is small.  
Chu (2009a) also analyses the distributional consequences of patent policy in the United States, but 
considers the effects on income and consumption inequality arising due to an unequal distribution of 
wealth among the households. His model predicts that strengthening patent protection increases (a) 
economic growth by stimulating R&D investment, and (b) income inequality by raising the return on 
assets. Strengthening patent protection raises R&D as well as the equilibrium growth rate that drives up 
the rate of return on assets. This higher return on assets increases the income of asset-wealthy households 
relative to that of asset-poor households. However, whether it also increases consumption inequality 
depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. If this elasticity is less (greater) 
than unity, strengthening patent protection would increase (decrease) consumption inequality. 
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Furthermore, the allowance of elastic labor supply creates an additional effect on income inequality 
through labor income.  
As far as empirical studies are concerned, there exists only one empirical study so far, which analyses the 
income-distributional consequences of stronger IPRs. Adams (2008) examines the relationship between 
IPRs and income inequality for a cross-section of 62 developing countries over a period of 17 years 
(1985-2001). The strength of IPRs in a country is measured by the Ginarte and Park index and income 
inequality is measured by the Gini index.6 He estimates a system of four equations using the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) method. The results of the study indicate that globalization explains only 
15% of the variance in income inequality. Stronger IPRs are positively correlated with income inequality. 
That is, increasing the Ginarte and Park IPR index by one (on a scale of zero to five) is associated with an 
increase in the Gini coefficient of 0.01 to 0.02 (on a scale of zero to one) in developing countries.  
A major conclusion that can be drawn from this (rather limited) existing literature is that strengthening of 
IPRs has far-reaching effects on income distribution within a country. The distributional aspects of IPRs 
have not been studied in depth at all. This is a significant gap in the existing research.  There is a need to 
study this aspect of debate on IPRs and welfare more closely. Our study constitutes a small yet important 
step in this direction. We propose to go beyond Adams (2008) in two specific ways. First, Adams 
(2008)’s study analyzed the impact of more stringent IPRs on income inequality in developing countries 
alone for the period of 1985-2001. During this period, TRIPs agreement had just about come into 
existence (on 1st January, 1995) under WTO, and developing countries had not begun to modify their 
domestic IPR regimes in compliance with the TRIPs agreement. We improve upon this by, firstly, taking 
the period of the study as 1995-2009, which corresponds to the time span when the developing countries 
actually started the process of complying with the TRIPs requirement. This helps us to capture more 
effectively the impact of strengthening IPRs. Secondly, The TRIPs agreement requires WTO members to 
meet certain minimum standards within a stipulated period of time, therefore, the burden of harmonizing 
the IPR system across countries largely falls on the shoulders of developing member countries as TRIPs 
agreement specifies the minimum standards to be fulfilled based on those enforced in developed 
countries. Thus, there is a possibility that the effect of stronger IPRs on income distribution in developed 
countries may not be too distortionary. An investigation of this possibility requires empirical 
substantiation that covers both developed and developing countries in the analysis.  Adams’s (2008) study 
focuses on the relationship between IPRs and income inequality in developing countries alone. We 
include both developed and developing countries in the study, which allows us to bring out more starkly 
the differences in the income-distributions implications of stronger IP protection between the two groups 
of countries.    
3. Theoretical Framework 
This section discusses the theoretical framework that constitutes the basis for the empirical analysis.  
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 The Gini index is measured as the Gini coefficient multiplied by 100. The Gini coefficient is a ratio with values 
between 0 and 1, with 0 representing perfect income equality and 1 being perfect inequality. The income inequality 
data is obtained from Chen, Datt and Ravallion (2004) POVCAL software, maintained on the World Bank’s 
website. 
6 
 
The theoretical framework of our empirical research has been borrowed from Chu and Peng (2011). They 
develop a quality ladders model based on Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and extend it to a two-country 
setting with trade in intermediate inputs, and with wealth heterogeneity among households. In their 
model, there are two countries -- denoted as North and South. Both the North and the South invest in 
R&D, but North has a higher degree of innovative capability than the South. There is a continuum of 
identical households (except for the initial holding of wealth) on the unit interval ℎ ∈  [0, 1] in each of the 
two countries- North (N) and South (S). In country N, household’s (ℎ′
)  utility function is given by: 
(ℎ) =   
∞

ln  (ℎ), 
where (ℎ)  denotes household ℎ ’s consumption in country N at time  .  >  0  is the exogenous 
discount rate or the rate of time preference. Household  ℎ ’s share of financial assets at time 0  is 
exogenously given by 
, (ℎ) ≡ [(ℎ) ⁄ ] and it has a general distribution function with mean of one 
and standard deviation !(i.e. coefficient of variation of wealth).7 
From the household ℎ’s intertemporal optimization, the Euler equation is derived to be of the standard 
form given as:  
"(ℎ)
(ℎ) =  
"
 =  #
 −  
 
where "(ℎ) ⁄ (ℎ) is identical for all h and # ≡  % − &" &'  is the real rate of return on assets. Chu 
and Peng (2011) show that the aggregate economy is always on a unique and stable balanced-growth path 
and the distribution of assets is stationary along the steady state. Along the steady state or the balanced 
growth path, all the variables grow at some constant (or possibly zero) rate. 
 The income inequality is measured by the coefficient of variation of income, given by: 
!(  ≡  )* +
,, (ℎ) − 1-. ℎ/   = 0 12
3
1 231435 !                                                      (1)   
where the coefficient of variation of wealth ! is exogenously given at time 0. 6 captures the 
productivity of R&D workers in country n. 7 is the rate of growth of consumption in the balanced 
growth path, such that 
7 ≡ 893"893 = [(1 − :); +  :;=]>?@.                                                  (2) 
 ;A is the Poisson arrival rate of invention in country i , where i = s, n and z > 1 is the exogenous quality 
improvement from each invention. 
Holding ρ, 6 and ! constant in Eq. (1), notably income inequality is found to be increasing in the 
growth rate of income. This follows from  B!(/B7 > 0. An increase in patent protection in any country 
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 (ℎ) is the value of financial assets owned by household h in country n at time 0. 
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improves the incentives for R&D. This causes labor to move from the production sector to the R&D 
sector, thus leading to an increase in economic growth (from eq.(2)). The higher economic growth raises 
income inequality in both the countries. Implicitly, a higher growth rate increases the real interest rates 
through the Euler equation which in turn, implies higher return on financial assets. This higher return on 
financial assets raises the income of financial asset-wealthy households relative to  financial asset-poor 
households in each country. As a result, stronger IPRs increase income disparities among households 
within a country. 
Further, Chu and Peng (2011) derive the pre-TRIPs Nash equilibrium level of patent protection that is 
sub-optimally low as it does not account for cross-country spillover effects of patent protection. Also, the 
North chooses a higher level of patent protection than the South. An imposition of the North’s higher 
level of patent protection on the South, as required by TRIPs Agreement, increases welfare in the North 
but decreases welfare in the South, as South deviates from its best response, making it worse-off.8 They 
find that there exists a critical degree of cross-country spillovers below (above) which global welfare is 
lower (higher) under TRIPs Agreement than in the absence of it. This varying degree of cross-country 
spillover is explained by the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption. When the share of 
foreign goods in domestic consumption is small, cross-country spillovers of innovation are small as well. 
In this case, imposing the North’s level of patent protection on the South makes the South worse off 
without making the North much better off. When foreign goods constitute a very small portion of 
domestic consumption, both North and South are almost in autarky. Innovation in the North will not lead 
to a large increase in monopoly profits if foreign goods are not demanded in South. Therefore, North will 
not be much better off and as explained above, South is also worse off due to deviation from its best 
response. As a result, global welfare will fall if the share of foreign goods in domestic consumption is 
small. The above finding implies that a sufficient degree of globalization is a necessary condition for the 
harmonization of IPR protection to improve global welfare. The TRIPs agreement is likely to have 
asymmetric effects on the North and the South. 
Drawing on the main findings of Chu and Peng (2011), our empirical analysis set out the hypothesis that 
strengthening of IPRs leads to an increase in income inequality in WTO-member developing countries, 
while controlling for variables such as net FDI inflows, imports as a percentage of GDP, per capita GDP 
growth rates and literacy levels (i.e. attainment of secondary education). We test for both the direct and 
indirect channels through which strengthening of IPRs can increase income inequality. Stringent IPRs  
raise income inequality directly, for example, through wage distribution and indirectly via growth rates 
through the channel of wealth distribution as postulated by Chu and Peng (2011). The analysis also for 
any differential impact of IPRs on income inequality in developed vis-à-vis developing countries.  
The following sections include a discussion on the data sources used in the study, the specific empirical 
relationship being estimated, and the associated hypotheses to be tested.    
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 South has lower innovative capability than North. Therefore, South has a lower level of patent protection before 
TRIPs but South has to increase its level of patent protection as required by TRIPs which makes it worse-off. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data 
The data have been obtained from various sources. Most of the data are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators, World Bank. A set of 65 countries (29 developed and 36 developing), have been 
chosen for our analysis which cover the time period 1995-2009.The sample of countries is diverse, 
representing different income groups and regions9. 
The most widely used measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient (Gini index). Its value 
typically ranges from 0 to 1(100). A low Gini coefficient (Gini index) indicates a more equal distribution, 
with 0 corresponding to complete equality, while a higher value of the Gini coefficients (Gini indices) 
indicates more unequal distribution, with 1 (100 on the percentile scale) corresponding to complete 
inequality. The lack of comparable Gini coefficients -- both between countries and over time -- has long 
been a major obstacle in research on inequality. Gini coefficients cannot be compared globally due to the 
differing methodologies within and across countries and large data gaps over time. The Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2009) is the most comprehensive cross-national 
database of Gini indices across time. The SWIID standardizes Gini estimates from all major existing 
resources of inequality data, including UNU-WIDER (2008), the WorldBank’s POVCALNET and other 
sources.10  Overall, the SWIID includes Gini estimates for gross and net income inequality for 171 
countries from 1960 to 2011.11 Therefore, our chosen measure for income inequality is the net income 
Gini index from SWIID.  
To measure IPRs, we use the Ginarte and Park index, a widely used index for measuring strength of 
intellectual property rights. It has been developed by Park and Ginarte (1997) and extended by Park 
(2008). Initially, the index was constructed for 110 countries quinquennially from 1960 to 1990. Park 
(2008) updated the index to 2005 and extended it to 122 countries. Five categories of patent laws have 
been examined: (1) extent of coverage, (2) membership of international patent agreements, (3) provisions 
for loss of protection, (4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) duration of protection. Each of these 
categories (per country, per time period) scores a value ranging from 0 to 1. These five categories of the 
index pertain to the aggregate economy as a whole. The unweighted sum of these five values constitutes 
the overall value of the patent rights index. The index, therefore, ranges in value from 0 to 5. Higher 
values of the index indicate stronger levels of protection. (See Annexure C for a detailed description of 
the index). 
Furthermore, our analysis also takes into the effect of a range of other variables on income inequality. For 
instance, the literature also focuses on globalization in explaining for income inequality in the South. The 
exposure of developing countries to international markets is measured by the degree of trade protection, 
the share of imports and/or exports in GDP, the magnitude of capital flows -- FDI in particular, and 
exchange rate fluctuations in this literature on openness and income inequality (Milanovic 2005, Dollar 
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 The countries included in the sample are listed in the Annexure A. 
10
 http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html .( Accessed  on 20 December, 2013) 
11
 Gross income inequality estimates are calculated using gross income of households. Gross income is income 
before deduction of taxes and addition of transfers. Similarly, net income inequality estimates are based on net 
income which is defined as income after deducting taxes and adding transfers. 
9 
 
and Kraay 2002, Beer 1999, Sylwester 2005, Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). Following this strand of 
literature, we have included two indicators of openness in our model – net FDI inflows as percentage of 
GDP (FDI) and imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP (IMP).12 The variable IMP captures 
the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption, which is a key factor in determining the 
implication of stronger IPRs on income inequality in Chu and Peng (2011).13 The data for both of these 
variables have been taken from the World Development Indicators Database which is available on World 
Bank’s website.14 
Education should also be taken into account while explaining within-country income inequality.  An 
increase in education implies an increase in the supply of skilled labor force, a decrease in the relative 
skilled/ unskilled wage differential and an overall decrease in income inequality (Meschi and Vivarelli 
2009). We have included an indicator of secondary education (SEC EDU) in our model. SEC EDU 
measures the level of educational attainment of population in a country. It is defined as the percentage of 
population aged 15 years and above who have completed their secondary education. The data for this 
variable has been taken from the Barro-Lee database.15 
Additional insights into the factors that affect income inequality are derived from the political economy 
models that attribute an important role to political and governance structure of a country in determining 
the extent of income disparities. The existence of political and civil liberties and higher education levels 
restrict the ability of a rich minority to influence economic policy in its own interest and, therefore, lead 
to lower income inequality. Good governance (institutions and policies that enforce property rights and 
restrain government corruption) are associated with lower income inequality (Knack and Anderson 1999). 
Keeping these findings in mind, we have included one indicator reflecting the political conditions of the 
countries in our analysis. Political stability and absence of violence measures the perceptions about the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. The data for this indicator are taken from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database.16 (See Annexure D for explanation of methodology 
used for calculating these indices.) 
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 Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from 
foreign investors, and is divided by GDP.(Source :World Development Indicators from World Bank) 
13
 Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of 
the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and 
other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government 
services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and 
transfer payments.(Source : World Development Indicators from World Bank). 
14
 www.data.worldbank.org   ( Accessed  on 20 December, 2013) 
15
 http://www.barrolee.com/ ( Accessed  on 22 January, 2013).Barro-Lee Dataset provides educational attainment 
data for 146 countries in 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010 
16
 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset produced by Daniel Kaufmann (Brookings 
Institution), Aart Kraay (World Bank Development Research Group) and Massimo Mastruzzi (World Bank 
Institute).WGI  summarizes the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprises, 
citizens and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a 
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Besides the above-mentioned explanatory variables, we have also incorporated per capita GDP growth 
rates and annual population growth rates in our empirical tests. The coefficient of the variable GDP 
captures the relationship between income-inequality and income growth rate.17 The coefficient of the 
variable POP indicates how the distribution of income changes as a country experiences growth in 
population.18 The data for these two variables are also obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database available on World Bank’s website.19 The following table summarizes the variables used 
in our analysis and the source from which these data are obtained. 
Table 1.1 Data definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
INCOME 
INEQ. Gini index on net income Solt (2009) 
IPRS Ginarte and Park Index Ginarte and Park(1997) 
and Park(2008) 
SEC EDU Percentage of population aged 15 and over who have 
completed their secondary education. Barro and Lee(2013) 
GDP Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. 
World Development 
Indicators(WDI) 
IMP Imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP World Development Indicators(WDI) 
FDI Net FDI inflows as percentage of GDP World Development Indicators(WDI) 
POP Annual population growth rate in percentage terms World Development Indicators(WDI) 
POL STAB Perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown 
World Governance 
Indicators(WGI) 
 
4.2. Model Specification 
The empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel of 65 countries covering the time period of 1995-
2009. Our baseline econometric model is specified as follows: 
DEFGH DEHIA  =
J/ +  J.. D&%LA + JM . LH HNA +  JO. PN&P%FQRSA +  JT. PN&P%FQRSA . D&%LA + JU. DG&A +
JV. WNDA + JX. &F&A + JY. &FZ LR[\A + J/. D&%LA. N + J//. PN&P%FQRSA. D&%LA. N +
  ]A .                                                                                                                                                    (3) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private 
sector firms. 
17
 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita is based on constant local currency. GDP per capita is Gross 
Domestic Product divided by midyear population.GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources.(Source: WDI) 
18
 Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, 
expressed as a percentage.(Source: WDI) 
19
  www.data.worldbank.org   ( Accessed  on 20 December, 2013)  
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In the above equation, DEFGH DEHIA  refers to income inequality measured by the Gini index for 
country ^ in period . D&%LA  uses the Ginarte and Park IPRs index. LH HNA  measures the level of 
education attainment for country i in period .  PN&P%FQRSA  represents the annual growth rate of per 
capita GDP.  DG&A   and  WNDA  represent imports as a percentage of GDP and net FDI inflows as a 
percentage of GDP respectively. &F&A  is the population growth rate. &FZ LR[\A   is the indicator for 
political stability and absence of violence. DC is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for 
developed countries and 0, otherwise.  
The data sources and definitions have already been discussed in the previous section. Since Ginarte and 
Park index for intellectual property rights and Barro-Lee education indicators are available 
quinquennially, the most common approach adopted in the existing empirical literature is to use data 
averaged over five-year periods to deal with this problem of missing data (Kanwar 2003).Data is averaged 
in order to remove short-term variation that may obscure the long-term effects, and since the variable of 
main interest – the Ginarte and Park index -- for IPR protection is only available quinquennially. We have 
also adopted the same approach. Our panel comprises of data averaged for three 5-year time periods.20 
In our baseline model, the distributional implications of IPRS are separately captured for developing and 
developed countries by the partial derivatives expressed below: 
∂ DEFGH DEHIA / ∂ D&%LA |DC=0 =  J. +  JO. PN&P%FQRSA  
   [for developing countries (i.e. for DC = 0)]. 
 ∂ DEFGH DEHIA / ∂ D&%LA |DC=1 = (J. + J/) + (JO + J//). PN&P%FQRSA 
   [for developed countries (i.e. for DC = 1)]. 
These partial effects of IPRs need to be evaluated at appropriate values of  PN&P%FQRSA  .We evaluate 
these partial effects using the average of the averaged per capita GDP growth rates for the sub-period 
2005-2009, separately for developed and developing countries in the sample. 21  To do this, we re-
parameterize our baseline model as follows: 
DEFGH DEHIA =
J/ +  J.. D&%LA + JM . LH HNA +  JO. PN&P%FQRSA +
 JT. (PN&P%FQRSA − PN&P%FQRS_`a). (D&%LA − D&%L_`a)  + JU. DG&A + JV. WNDA +
JX. &F&A + JY. &FZ LR[\A + J/. D&%LA . N + J//(PN&P%FQRSA − PN&P%FQRS_`a). (D&%LA −
D&%L_`a). N + J/.. PN&P%FQRSA . N +  ]A .                                                                           (4) 
where D&%L_`a  is the average value of Ginarte and Park IPR index for the period 2005-09 and 
PN&P%FQRS_`a is the average of the averaged per capita GDP growth rates for the period 2005-09. In 
the reparameterized model, the variables D&%LA  and PN&P%FQRSA  are measured as distances or 
                                                           
20
 Three 5-year time periods are 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2009.Therefore, we have three data points for each 
country, for a total of 195 observations. 
21
 Since data for Ginarte and Park IPR index and Barro-Lee education indicators is available quinquennially, we 
have used data that has been averaged for three 5-year sub-periods. To evaluate total marginal effect of IPRs on 
income inequality, therefore, we have used deviations of average GDP per capita growth rates from the average of 
the averaged GDP per capita growth rates. 
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deviations from the average IPR and average of averaged per capita GDP growth rate values  
respectively.22 
We expect a positive and significant coefficient of  D&%LA , similar to Adams (2008), who found a 
significant and positive relationship between IPRs and income inequality. We have included an 
interactive term for the IPR index and per capita GDP growth rate in our panel regression. This interactive 
term captures the conditional relationship between IPRs and income inequality. It measures the effect of 
strengthening of IPRs on income inequality conditional on per capita GDP growth rate. Higher rate of 
economic growth is, generally, positively associated with greater investments and higher employment-
generating processes that provide greater access to jobs and income to a larger number of people. 
Therefore, this interactive term is important as it reveals how IPRs affect income inequality differentially, 
depending upon the GDP growth rate per capita of the country. If the coefficient of 
PN&P%FQRSA . D&%LA is found to be positive and significant, we can conclude that IPRs raise income-
inequality more for countries experiencing higher rates of economic growth per capita. Else, if the 
coefficient of the interactive term is negative and significant, then the increase in inequality due to 
strengthening of IPRs is offset, and more so for countries exhibiting a higher rate of economic growth per 
capita. In fact, if this coefficient is significantly negative, then turning points in Gini index cannot be 
ruled out. 
Further, the literature on openness and income inequality finds openness to be pro-inequality (Beer 1999, 
Barro 2000, Lundberg and Squire 2003, Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). Therefore, we expect our two 
indicators of openness-DG&A  and WNDA  to be positively related with income inequality. The variable 
PN&P%FQRSA  captures the relationship between economic growth and income inequality, which could 
be positive or negative. We expect the variable &FZ LR[\A  to be negatively related with income 
inequality as factors that facilitate good governance reduce income inequality (Knack and Anderson 
1999). LH HNA  is expected to have a negative sign as education imparts skills leading to decrease in 
skilled-unskilled wage gap (Calderon and Chong 2000).  
5. Empirical results 
This section discusses the key results of our study.  
 
5.2. Basic Tests 
The countries in our sample are quite heterogeneous.  For example, they have different economic sizes, 
implying that the variance of the error term is unlikely to be constant across countries; instead, it is likely 
to vary with the size of the economy. Failure to take this into account would mean that the estimated 
model would assign a greater weight to a country with a higher GDP per capita (i.e. countries with larger 
error variances) than to the smaller ones (with lower GDP per capita) causing misleading results. 
Therefore, diagnostic tests need to be done to check for the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation in our data.  
                                                           
22
 For the developed countries, these distances have been measured from the average IPR and average of averaged 
GDPGROWTH values of 4.31 and 1.96% respectively. Similarly, the distances have been measured from the 
average IPR and average of averaged GDPGROWTH values of 3.36 and 4.55% for developing countries. 
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The modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity is performed to check for heteroscedasticity of 
the error term across countries. The null hypothesis is that the error variance is constant across countries. 
The p-value of the Wald test is 0.0000 which implies that the null hypothesis is rejected. There exists 
group-wise heteroscedasticity, that is, the error variance varies across countries. Similarly, Woolridge 
(2002) test is done to check for autocorrelation in our panel data. The null hypothesis is that there exists 
no first-order autocorrelation. The p-value of the Woolridge test is 0.0046 which is sufficiently low to 
reject the null hypothesis. This implies there also exists autocorrelation of order one. Thus, our diagnostic 
tests indicate that our error terms are heteroscedastic and autocorrelated.23 
We have run regressions on both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) specifications corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.24Although the Hausman test favors FE over RE, we have chosen 
RE specification over FE one because the latter explores the relationship between the predictor and the 
outcome variables within an entity (country, person, company, etc.).It ignores time-invariant variables 
that might affect the dependent variable. Any potential bias stemming from possibly omitted time-
invariant variables does not bias the FE estimation, since the individual-specific intercepts capture the 
effects of these variables. However, by eliminating the effects of omitted heterogeneity through FE 
estimation, the valuable information stemming from the variation between individuals is lost as well. 
Higher standard errors and thus imprecise parameter estimates are the consequence of ignoring the 
variation between individuals (Durlauf et al 2005: 629-631).  In such cases where explanatory RE 
approach is suggested more appropriate.  
In our model, income inequality varies much more across countries than over time. The Gini coefficient 
(indicator of income inequality) reports between- country standard deviation of 9.901 units and within- 
country standard deviation of 2.402 units. The characteristics of this variance cannot be examined by the 
techniques that eliminate cross-country effects and focus exclusively on the within-country relationships 
(i.e. FE estimators). Moreover, most of the explanatory variables included in our study exhibit greater 
between-country variations than within-country variations, indicating that a significant amount of 
valuable information would be lost if FE specification is used.(Table B.1. in Annexure B  reports the 
decomposed standard deviations of the variables included in the model.) Also, Kanwar (2003) states that 
the advantage of the RE model follows from the fact that estimating a FE model implies not only 
substantially fewer degrees of freedom but also rules out all information that may be available by directly 
comparing individual units. This would provide misleading results particularly when the number of 
individual units in a panel exceeds the number of time periods, for, in such a situation, we must make 
efficient use of the information across individual units to estimate that part of the behavioral relationship 
under study which contains variables that (are hypothesized to) differ substantially across the units. The 
number of countries in our panel far exceeds the number of time periods.25  For the reason stated by 
Kanwar (2003), RE would be a more appropriate choice. Therefore, we have chosen RE over FE 
estimation. 
                                                           
23Detailed results of the diagnostic tests are given in Annexure E. 
24Regressions results of FE specification are given in Annexure F. 
25
 We have data for three time-periods of five year interval for each of the 65 countries in our sample. 
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5.2. Discussion of results 
Table 1.2 reports regression results of our RE model that has been corrected for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity using the method of Feasible GLS (FGLS). FGLS is the method suggested when the 
form of heteroscedasticity has to be estimated before applying GLS. FGLS estimates the unknown 
parameters of the regression model when the true error variance-covariance matrix is not known. FGLS 
uses an estimated error variance-covariance matrix to find the parameters of the model (Greene 2003).  
Table 1.2 Regression coefficients for the impact of IPRs on income inequality corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
 Dependent Variable: Net income Gini coefficient 
Time Period 1995-2009 
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
IPR     0.9746** 
(0.3659) 
    1.8067** 
(0.1611) 
GDPGROWTH    -0.7538** 
(0.2279) 
0.0458 
(0.0502) 
IPR*GDPGROWTH     0.2368** 
(0.0755) - 
         (IPR-IPRAVG).(GDP-GDPAVG)  
 
 
    0.2272** 
(0.0649) 
SEC EDU    -0.1023** 
(0.0167) 
-0.0995* 
(0.0172) 
FDI -0.0679 
(0.0485) 
-0.0611 
(0.0493) 
IMP     0.0328** 
(0.0099) 
    0.0324** 
(0.0100) 
POP     3.1452** 
(0.2496) 
  2.5932* 
(0.2664) 
POL STAB 
   -3.7614** 
(0.2062) 
-3.7194* 
(0.1894) 
IPR*DC 
  -1.8541** 
(0.2045) 
-2.1917* 
(0.1847) 
(IPR*GDPGROWTH)*DC                -0.0112 
(0.0320) - 
(IPR-IPRAVG).(GDP-GDPAVG)*DC 
 
- 
  0.4573* 
(0.1865) 
GDPGROWTH*DC 
 
- 
  0.2981* 
(0.1285) 
cons 
  36.8462** 
(1.1805) 
   34.9324** 
(0.8419) 
Number of countries 65 65 
Standard errors in parenthesis. **significant at 1% level of significance.* significant at 5% level of significance 
Column 1 reports the regression results of regression equation (3) ( i.e. the baseline model) and Column 2 
reports the regression results of the regression equation (4) (i.e the re-parameterized model). With respect 
to our variables of key interest, we find that the coefficient of the variable IPR is positively correlated 
with income inequality and is statistically significant (Column1 and 2).However, as previously discussed, 
the total marginal impact of an increase in IPR index is estimated by the following partial derivatives: 
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∂ DEFGH DEHIA / ∂ D&%LA |DC=0 =  J. +  JO. PN&P%FQRSA                                                (5) 
   [for developing countries (i.e. for DC = 0)]. 
∂ DEFGH DEHIA / ∂ D&%LA |DC=1 = (J. + J/) + (JO + J//). PN&P%FQRSA                      (6) 
[for developed countries (i.e. for DC = 1)]. 
The value of ∂ INCOME INEQit / ∂ IPRSit  for developing countries, which is evaluated using the 
developing country averages is positive and statistically significant (see R1.1 in BOX 1). This 
corroborates our hypothesis that the strengthening of IPRs leads to a direct increase in income inequality. 
Stronger patent rights can increase wage inequality by increasing the return to R&D and the wages of 
R&D workers, who are generally employed as skilled labor (Cozzi and Galli 2009). The strengthening of 
IPRs not only directly raises income inequality at given GDP growth rates, but this  direct effect of IPRs 
on income inequality is  more pronounced for countries experiencing higher levels of GDP growth rates. 
However, the value of  ∂ INCOME INEQit / ∂ IPRSit    for developed countries that is evaluated using 
developed country averages is found to be negative and statistically significant, implying that IPRs tend 
to decrease income inequality in developed countries (see R1.2 in BOX 1).. This is quite plausible as 
these countries do not experience a high skilled-unskilled wage bias as majority of the workforce is 
skilled. Therefore, strengthening of IPRs improves the income distribution. Furthermore, most of the 
developed countries had instituted a stringent IPRs regime even before the TRIPs agreement came into 
force. As a result, the worsening effect of IPRs on income distribution is more pronounced for developing 
countries. 
BOX 1.Marginal effect of change in IPR index on income inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal effect of change in IPR index on income inequality is given by: 
∂ DEFGH DEHIA / ∂ D&%LA |DC=0 =  J. +  JO. PN&P%FQRSA  
   [for developing countries (i.e. for DC = 0)]. 
 ∂ DEFGH DEHIA / ∂ D&%LA |DC=1 = (J. + J/) + (JO + J//). PN&P%FQRSA 
   [for developed countries (i.e. for DC = 1)]. 
Result 1.1 (R1.1) For developing countries, we reject the null ∂ INCOME INEQit /∂ IPRSit |DC=0 = 
0.The coefficients β2. and β4 are jointly significant at 1% level. The value of  ∂ INCOME INEQit / ∂ 
IPRSit    for developing countries evaluated using developing countries’ GDPGROWTH average is 
1.817.This implies that a unit increase in IPR index (on a scale of 0 to 5) leads to 1.817 units 
increase in Gini index (on a scale of 0 to 100) when evaluated at average of averaged per capita 
GDP growth rates for developing countries. 
Result 1.2 (R1.2) For developed countries also, we reject the null ∂ INCOME INEQit /∂ IPRSit |DC=1 
= 0. The coefficients (β2 + β10) and (β4 + β11) are jointly significant at 1% level.  
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Strengthening of IPRs can affect income distribution indirectly through the channel of wealth of 
distribution as postulated by Chu and Peng (2011). More stringent IPRs lead to an increase in income 
growth rate. This income growth rate raises the rate of return on financial assets which creates disparities 
in the distribution of wealth among households (the wealth effect) which in turn, exacerbates income 
inequality. We would have liked to empirically test for this  indirect relationship between IPRs and 
income inequality, working through the channel of wealth inequality by using a model of simultaneous 
equations; However, we could not attempt it due to scanty cross-sectional and time series data availability 
on wealth inequality.26  
The closest empirical test that we could attempt to capture this indirect effect of IPRs on income 
inequality is by assuming that strengthening of IPRs causes an increase in GDP growth rates and then, 
evaluating how this increase in per capita GDP growth rate affects income inequality. The existing 
literature on IPRs and economic growth is of the view that the effect of IPR protection on growth depends 
on the level of development of a country. It is positively and significantly related to growth for low- and 
high-income countries, but not for middle-income countries (Falvey, Foster, & Greenaway 2006; 
Schneider 2005).Therefore, we assume that more stringent IPRs lead to an increase in income growth 
rates based on the findings of the existing empirical literature on the subject and study the total marginal 
impact of per capita GDP growth rates on income inequality evaluated at average level of IPR protection ( 
see BOX 2). We find that the increase in per capita GDP growth rate leads to an increase in income 
inequality in both developed and developing countries, but the magnitude of increase in income inequality 
is more for developed countries as compared to developing countries. This might suggest that the 
intensity of the indirect wealth effect of IPRs on income distribution is more (less) pronounced for 
developed (developing) countries. However, we cannot conclude anything precisely here, as we were 
unable to test for the indirect wealth effect of IPRs due to data constraints.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
26
 The empirical literature related to wealth or asset inequality, generally, uses data on land distribution as the proxy 
for wealth distribution. However, land distribution data has its own limitations. The data on land distribution is 
provided by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).FAO conducts a World Census of Agriculture under which it 
provides a common framework within which individual countries perform agricultural census approximately every 
ten years. The country results are collected by the FAO into a summary census which is published decennially. 
Since it is a decennial census, there are not enough data points available for a cross-sectional study like ours. 
The value of  ∂ INCOME INEQit /∂ IPRSit    for developed countries evaluated using developed 
countries’ GDPGROWTH average is found to be - 0.3715. This implies that a unit increase in IPR 
index ( again on a scale of 0 to 5) leads to 0.3715 unit decrease in Gini index (on a scale of 0 to 
100) when evaluated at average of averaged per capita GDP growth rates for developed countries. 
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BOX 2 Marginal effect of change in per capita GDP growth rate on income inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further, we find that FDI has a negative effect on income inequality but this effect is significant at higher 
levels of significance only (at around 20% with a p-value of 0.183). Empirical studies done in the past 
have provided mixed evidence on the relationship between income inequality and FDI. Choi (2006) finds 
that the increase in the FDI intensity, measured by inward, outward and total FDI stock as a percentage of 
GDP, increases the income inequality. Beer (1999) also reports a positive correlation between FDI and 
income inequality whereas Sylwester (2005) finds that there is no strong positive association between 
FDI and changes in income inequality in LDCs over the time period 1970-1989. But, one of the reasons 
for this result may be that FDI inflows did not play a significant role in the economies of the LDCs during 
the earlier time period considered. The average annual FDI inflows flowing to LDCs was only 0.43% as a 
percentage of GDP during the period of 1980-89. The average annual FDI inflows to LDCs increased to 
1.62% during the period 1990-1999.27 It is only in the 1990s that financial globalization and capital 
mobility have assumed greater importance for developing countries’ economies. Owing to this, FDI did 
not register any significant effect on the distribution of income. Similar to our results, Adams (2008) also 
finds that the coefficient of FDI is negative and, in a few cases, even significantly related to income 
inequality. He also finds that FDI’s impact is sensitive to regional differences. FDI inflows are sensitive 
to the level of development of the countries (measured by lagged value of GDP per capita) included in his 
study’s sample.28  
                                                           
27
 Own calculations based on data taken from UNCTADSTAT. ( 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx). Data accessed on 20 Feb, 2014. 
28He has regressed the dependent variable at a time T against the independent variables at a previous time period (T-
1, T-2, or T-3) depending on the availability of Gini data. 
   Marginal effect given by: 
 ∂ INCOME INEQit / ∂ GDPGROWTHit |DC=0 = β3. + β4. IPRSit . 
  ∂ INCOME INEQit / ∂ GDPGROWTHit |DC=1 = (β3 + β12) + (β4 + β11).IPRSit  . 
For developing countries, we reject the null ∂ INCOME INEQit / ∂ GDPGROWTHit |DC=0 =0. The 
coefficients β3.and β4 are jointly significant at 1% level. The value of  ∂ INCOME INEQit / ∂ 
GDPGROWTHit   for developing countries evaluated using developing countries’ average value for 
IPRS is 0.008. This implies that a unit percentage point increase in GDPGROWTH) leads to 0.008 
units increase in Gini index (on a scale of 0 to 100) when evaluated at average value of  IPR index of 
developing countries. 
For developed countries also, we reject the null ∂ INCOME INEQit / ∂ GDPGROWTHit |DC=1 =0. The 
coefficients (β2 + β10) and (β4 + β11) are jointly significant at 1% level. The value of  ∂ INCOME 
INEQit / ∂ GDPGROWTHit    for developed countries evaluated using developed country average 
value for IPRS is 0.033. This implies  that a one percentage point increase in GDPGROWTH leads to 
0.033 units increase in Gini index (on a scale of 0 to 100) when evaluated at average value of IPR 
index of developed countries. 
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Our variable for openness, captured by imports as a percentage of GDP, is found to be significantly and 
positively correlated with income inequality (0.033) in all the model specifications, suggesting that 
increased integration into the world economy worsens the distribution of income in countries.29 Trade can 
affect income distribution of a country through many channels. For instance, when developing countries 
liberalize trade, they become more exposed to technologies and innovations produced in the more 
advanced countries, which leads to a general bias in the demand for labour that is endowed with higher 
skills, a consequent increase in wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor force, and so an 
increase in inequality in developing countries (Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). Similarly, Calderon and 
Chong (2001) assert that the volume of trade (openness) affects long run distribution of income. They 
find that the composition of exports also matters as primary commodity exporting countries, of which 
most are developing ones, are associated with an increase in  income inequality, while manufacturing 
goods exporting countries, of which most are developed, are found to experience a  decline in income  
inequality. 
Bearing in mind that a positive sign in the corresponding coefficient of an explanatory variable indicates a 
worsening in the distribution of income we find that, with respect to our core controls - population growth 
rates have a significantly positive impact on income inequality. Political stability and absence of violence 
is negatively correlated with income inequality. Our results confirm that schooling appears to reduce 
income inequality (Chong and Calderon, 2000; Squire, 1998). 
6. Concluding remarks 
As discussed in the introductory section, against the backdrop of TRIPs Agreement, our study focuses on 
the analysis of the impact of strengthening IPRs on income distribution in developing countries after they 
became members of WTO in 1995, and initiated the process of complying with the requirements of the 
TRIPs Agreement. We find that strengthening of IPRs has led to an increase in income inequality in 
WTO-member developing countries after they started modifying their national IPR regimes in accordance 
with the TRIPs requirements. Intuitively, IPRs tend to raise income inequality by generating a more 
skewed distribution of wages. The underlying notion is that stronger IPRs increase the demand for skilled 
labor force as it raises the return on R&D activities. This causes a relative increase in skilled labor wages, 
creating a wage bias in favor of skilled labor against unskilled labor, thus aggravating income inequality 
within a developing country. Moreover, the effect on inequality is more pronounced for countries that are 
experiencing higher per capita GDP growth rates. 
As for the developed countries included in the sample, our analysis seems to suggest that IPRs have led to 
a decline in income inequality over the study period. This can be due to the pre-existence of a strict IPR 
regime in developed countries way before the TRIPs Agreement came in to effect. This, combined with 
the fact that developed countries’ workforce is largely skilled, IPRs have little scope to worsen income 
inequality in developed countries.  
In terms of policy implications, the immediate impact of intellectual property protection is to benefit 
financially those who have the knowledge and inventive power, and to increase the costs of access to non-
                                                           
29Imports as a percentage of GDP captures the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption and therefore, 
the degree of integration of the domestic economy with the world economy in our empirical model just  it has been 
used in Chu and Peng (2011)’s theoretical model.  
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holders of knowledge. In a majority of developing countries, with weak scientific and technical 
infrastructure, the benefits in the form of stimulus to domestic innovation will be limited and in addition, 
they will face the costs arising from the protection of (mainly foreign) technologies. Thus, the costs and 
the benefits of the system as a whole may not be equitably distributed. IPRs should promote agricultural 
production by stimulating invention and new technologies in agricultural sector in developing countries. 
Most developing countries do not have a strong technological base which could benefit from IP protection 
but they do have genetic resources and traditional knowledge, which have value both to them and to the 
world at large. These are not necessarily IP resources in the sense that they are understood in developed 
countries, but they are certainly resources on the basis of which protected intellectual property can be, and 
has been, created (CIPR 2002). Therefore, this kind of resources also should be protected so that the 
owners of traditional form of knowledge and resources can get their due. 
Our research could be extended in several directions. In particular, the analysis could focus on the specific 
channels through which IPRs affect income inequality in developing countries, namely, through wage or 
asset inequality. This provides the scope for future research in this area.  A second possible direction is to 
determine the impact of stronger IPRs on wages in different sectors of a developing economy. This will 
help in giving an insight into the sensitivity of wages in different productive sectors of a developing 
economy in response to more stringent IPRs. 
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Annexure A: Sample of Countries  
 
Developed  Developing  
 
Austria 
Canada 
Chile 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Lithuania 
Netherland 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Russian Federation 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Fiji 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Swaziland 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Vietnam 
Venezuela 
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Annexure B: Summary Statistics 
Table B.1. Decomposed Standard Deviations 
    
Standard 
Deviation 
INCOME 
INEQ overall 10.139 
  between  9.901 
  within 2.402 
IPRS overall 0.929 
  between  0.816 
  within 0.452 
SEC EDU overall 12.663 
  between  12.311 
  within 3.217 
GDP overall 2.170 
  between  1.576 
  within 1.499 
IMP overall 24.945 
  between  24.597 
  within 4.842 
FDI overall 3.438 
  between  2.686 
  within 2.163 
POP overall 0.850 
  between  0.813 
  within 0.260 
POL STAB overall 0.884 
  between  0.867 
  within 0.191 
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Annexure C. Construction of the Ginarte and Park IPR Index 
1 Coverage                       YES                         NO 
Patentability of pharmaceuticals 1/8 0 
Patentability of chemicals 1/8 0 
Patentability of food 1/8 0 
Patentability of surgical products 1/8 0 
Patentability of microorganisms 1/8 0 
Patentability of utility models 1/8 0 
Patentability of software 1/8 0 
Patentability of plant and animal varieties 1/8 0 
2 Membership in international treaties                       YES                          NO 
Paris convention and revisions 1/5 0 
Patent cooperation treaty 1/5 0 
Protection of new varieties (UPOV) 1/5 0 
Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits) 1/5 0 
Trade-related intellectual  property rights(TRIPs) 1/5 0 
3 Duration of protection                       Full                    Partial 
1                      0<ƒ<1 
4 Enforcement mechanism              Available        Not   available 
Preliminary(pre-trial) injunctions 1/3 0 
Contributory infringement 1/3 0 
Burden of proof reversal 1/3 0 
5 Restrictions on patent rights     Does not exist                        Exists 
Working requirements 1/3 0 
Compulsory licensing 1/3 0 
Revocation of patents 1/3 0 
        
where ƒ is the duration of protection as a fraction of 20 years from the date of application or 17 years from 
the date of grant(for grant based patent systems).Overall score for patent rights index: sum of points under 
(1)-(5).Source: Park,W.G. (2008) 
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Annexure D: Methodology used in construction of Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators report on six broad dimensions of governance for over 200 
countries over the period 1996-2011: 
a. Voice and Accountability 
b. Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
c. Government Effectiveness 
d. Regulatory Quality 
e. Rule of law 
f. Control of Corruption. 
 
Political stability and absence of violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the  government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism.  
The WGI are composite governance indicators based on 30 underlying data sources. The WGI compile 
and summarize information from 30 existing data sources that report the views and experiences of citizens, 
entrepreneurs, and experts in the public, private and NGO sectors from around the world, on the quality of 
various aspects of governance. The WGI draw on four different types of sources of data: 
1. Surveys of households and firms (9 data sources including the Afrobarometer surveys, Gallup 
World Poll, and Global Competitiveness Report survey), 
2. Commercial business information providers (4 data sources including the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Global Insight, Political Risk Services), 
3. Non-governmental organizations (9 data sources including Global Integrity, Freedom House, 
Reporters Without Borders), and 
4. Public sector organizations (8 data sources including the  CPIA assessments of World Bank and 
regional development banks, the EBRD Transition Report, French Ministry of Finance 
Institutional Profiles Database). 
These data sources are rescaled and combined to create the six aggregate indicators using a 
statistical methodology known as an unobserved components model (UCM). The composite measures of 
governance generated by the UCM are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard 
deviation of one, and running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better 
governance. 
 
Source : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm#sources 
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          Annexure E:  Results of Diagnostic tests  
 
E.1   Test Results for Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
         E.2 Test Results for Autocorrelation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in cross-
sectional time-series FGLS regression model 
H0: !A. = !. for all i 
chi2 (65) = 1.0e+05 
                                   Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(  1,      64) =      8.594 
Prob > F =      0.0047 
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Annexure F: Regression coefficients for the impact of IPRs on income inequality corrected 
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity for FE model. 
 Dependent Variable: Net 
income Gini coefficient 
Time Period 1995-2009 
 Fixed Effects 
Independent Variable  
IPR 0.2130 (1.013) 
GDPGROWTH -0.9735 (0.761) 
IPR*GDPGROWTH 0.2430 (0.210) 
SEC EDU -0.1047* (0.036) 
FDI -0.1057 (0.088) 
IMP 0.0359* (0.018) 
POP 2.829* (0.672) 
POL STAB -3.0211* (0.731) 
IPR*DEVELOPED -2.0826* (0.411) 
Cons 41.2934* (3.797) 
Number of countries 65 
Standard errors in parenthesis. *significant at 1% and 5% level of significance. 
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